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NOTE
E,.QUITY- SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE- CONTRACT TO CONVEY-
ABATEMENT OR INDE-MNITY FOR OUTSTANDING INCHOATE DowER
INTEREST.-Generally a vendee may enforce specific performance
of a contract to convey real estate to the extent of the vendor's
ability to convey and have compensation for the difference between
the actual performance and the performance which would have been
an exact fulfillment of the terms of the contract.- There is, how-
ever, an irreconcilable conflict of authority as to whether this gen-
eral principle is applicable to cases where- a husband contracts
to convey lands, and his wife refuses to join therein and releases
her inchoate 'dower right.2
The courts have given three general types of relief to the
vendee in such cases.3 One group of courts (a majority of those
which have considered the problem) allows specific performance
'Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd ed., sec. 438; 2 Story,
Equity jurisprudence, 13th ed., sec. 779.2
"An irreconcilable conflict of authority," Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10
Del. Ch. 339, 345, 92 Atl. 256. "Perplexing question to the courts." Barbour
v. Hickey (1894) 2 App. D. C. 207, 213, 24 L. R. A. 763. "Much diversity
in the courts upon this question." Brookings v. Cooper, (1926) 256 Mass.
121, 124, 152 N. E. 243, 46 A. L. R. 745, and note.3See Horack, Specific Performance and Dower Rights, 11 Iowa Law Re-
view 97.
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of the contract to the extent of the husband's interest only upon
the vendee paying the full purchase price with no deductions for
the unreleased inchoate dower right4 of the vendor's wife in the
lands.5 These courts have advanced various reasons for refusing
either a decree of abatement or indemnity. One of the more popu-
lar reasons is that such a decree might coerce the vendor's wife
into releasing her dower interest,6 and the policy of the law is
that a wife is not to dispose of her dower right except by her own
spontaneous will.7 Nevertheless, it does seem that undue im-
portance has been given to the coercive weight of such a decree.'
Is a wife really coerced, or even slightly compelled, to give up her
dower interest "otherwise than by the exercise of her own free
and untrammelled will"' when even an abatement is allowed?
Then, too, what effect would an action at law against the vendor
for breach of contract have upon his wife ?1o
'In this note, the statutory interest of the wife in the real property that
her husband was seised of during coverture will be called dower, even though
technically speaking it is not dower.
5Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10 Del. Ch. 339, 92 AtI. 256; Reilly v. Culli-
nane, (1923) 53 App. D. C. 17, 287 Fed. 994; Ebert v. Arends, (1901) 190
Ill. 221, 60 N. E. 211 ; Solomon v. Schwitz, (1915) 185 Mich. 620, 152 N. W.
196. 3 A. L. R. 557; Rosenow v. Miller, (1922) 63 Mont. 451, 207 Pac. 618;
Bondarchuk v. Barber, (1944) 135 N. J. E. 334, 38 A. (2d) 872 (for the
facts of this case, see Recent Case, p. 289) ; Barnes v. Christy, (1921) 102
Ohio St. 160, 131 N. E. 352; Kuratli v. Jackson, (1911) 60 Or. 203, 118 Pac.
192, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1195, and note, Ann. Cas. 1914A 203; Riesz's Ap-
peal, (1873) 73 Pa. 485; Halden v. Falls, (1914) 115 Va. 779, 80 S. E.
576, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1034; Milam v. Williams, (1914) 73 W. Va.
467, 80 S. E. 770. See Free v. Little, (1907) 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407.
6Kuratli v. Jackson, (1911) 60 Or. 203, 118 Pac. 192, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1195, and note, Ann. Cas. 1914A 203; Stone v. Stanley, (1920) 92 N. J.
Eq. 310. 112 AtI. 496: Reillv v. Cullinane, (1923) 53 App. D. C. 17, 287 Fed.994. 9 "The policy of these decisions is very manifest. The wife is not to
be wrought upon by her love for her husband, and sympathy in his situation,
to do that which her judgment disapproves as contrary to her interest; nor
is he to be tempted to use undue means to procure her consent." Riesz's
Appeal, (1873) 73 Pa. 485, 490.
"'Undue importance seems to have been given to the coercive weight of
a decree of abatement of the price, or even a requirement that the husband
indemnify the vendee against his wife's claim." Long v. Chandler, (1914)
10 Del. Ch. 339, 352, 92 AtI. 256.
'"The letter and policy of the law forbid a wife to convey her interest in
land otherwise than by the exercise of her own free and untrammelled will."
Burk's Appeal, (1874) 75 Pa. 141, 146, 25 P. F. Smith, 147, 15 Am. Rep. 587.
,"'The rule, then, which looks only to the possible injury to the wife
because of the fact that she may be influenced by her husband, takes this
uncertain or possible injury as the basis of protection of the wife through the
refusal or specific performance, and fixes a certain and positive injury, in
many cases, upon the husband, and, in practically every case, upon the pur-
chaser from him, while the wife may still suffer as great an actual damage be-
cause of the husband's liability for damages at law." Horack, Specific Per-
formance and Dower Rights, 11 Iowa Law Review 97, 111.
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Perhaps the most serious objection,1 1 especially in the case of
abatement, is that the value of the wife's contingent dower interest
cannot be accurately determined.12 The amount of the purchase
price retained as abatement for indemnity should be equal to the
then present value of the outstanding dower interest of the vendor's
wife.'- But the value of a common law dower right" is dependent
upon three contingencies: the time elapsing before the death of the
first spouse, 1 which spouse survives, 16 and if the wife survives,
how long she lives after the death of her husband. 7 Thus the courts
would have to determine the life expectancies of two people.'" In
""If either an indemnity bond or an abatement in price should be re-
quired, the penalty of the one and the amount of the other would have to be
fixed. That could not be done without determining the value of the dower
right, which in its turn cannot be ascertained without prophesying the prior
death of the husband and forecasting the wife's demise-a gruesome, futile
task, which the courts cannot be called upon to undertake." Reilly v. Culli-
nane, (1923) 53 App. D. C. 17, 20, 287 Fed. 994.
12Humphrey v. Clement, (1867) 44 Ill. 299; Kuratli v. Jackson, (1911)
60 Or. 203, 118 Pac. 192, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1195, and note, Ann. Cas. 1914A
203. Haden v. Falls, (1914) 115 Va. 779, 80 S. E. 576, Ann. Cas. 1915C.
1034; Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10 Del. Ch. 339, 92 Atl. 256; Rosenaw v.
Miller, (1922) 63 Mont. 451, 207 Pac. 618, Reilly v. Cullinane, (1923) 53
App. D. C. 17, 287 Fed. 994.
13Hazelrig v. Hutson, (1862) 18 Ind. 481; Davis v. Parker, (1867) 96
Mass. 94, 14 Allen 94; Tebeau v. Ridge, (1914) 261 Mo. 547, 170 S. W. 871,
L. R. A. 1915C 367; Brookings v. Cooper, (1926) 256 Mass. 121, 152 N. E.
243, 46 A. L. R. 745, and note; Najarian v. Boyajian, (1927) 48 R. I.
213, 136 Atl. 767; City of Murray v. Holcomb, (1932) 243 Ky. 287, 47 S. W.
(2d) 1026.
'
4
"The estate of dower is an estate to which a widow is entitled at
common law, for the period of her life, in one-third of the lands and tene-
ments of which her husband was seised in fee simple or fee tail, and which her
issue, if any, would inherit." 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 733. Accord-
nig to the New York Decedent Estate Commission Reports, (1930) 295,
in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia dower still exists,
either virtually as it was at common law or in regulated form.
"Obviously a dower right which will vest immediately, or in the near
future, is of greater value than one which might not vest until several years
hence. Thus the courts which allow an abatement deduct the value of the
wife's right at the time of the conveyance. See footnote 13.
16"Until the death of the husband, the wife has merely a contingent right
or interest known as 'dower inchoate.' Until his death, she has a possibility
of an estate, conditional in the first place upon her survival of him ..
I Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 798.
"The wife gets a life estate, at common law, in one third the lands her
husband was seised of during coverture. Obviously, the longer she lives the
greater the value of her dower interest. See footnote 14.
'
8
"The proper rule for computing the present value of the wife's con-
tingent right of dower, during the life of the husband is to ascertain the
present value of an annunity for her life equal to the interest in the third of
the proceeds of the estate to which her contingent right of dower attaches,
and then to deduct from the present value of the annuity for her life, the
value of a similar annunity depending upon the joint lives of herself and
her husband; and the difference between those two sums will be the present
value of her contingent right of dower." Jackson v. Edwards, (1839) 7
Paige Ch. 386, 408. This rule seems to have been followed by many of the
courts which allow an abatement.
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states where they have statutory dower, by which the wife gets
an interest in fee if she survives her husband, 19 the problem is
somewhat simplified."- Yet, the courts must still determine how
much time will pass before the death of the first spouse, 21 and
which spouse will survive. 2 Some courts have said that the value
of the contingent dower interest can be "estimated" by tables of
mortality and by the statute of present values of estates less than
a fee.-'2 Perhaps "estimated" is the best word that could have been
used. "These mortality tables are no doubt approximately correct
as an average of many cases, yet in any individual case reliance
thereon would be a mere speculative hazard.1'2 4 It certainly seems
as if at least the courts which allow an abatement are gambling
with the money of the unwilling vendor. 25
Courts have proposed other reasons for refusing a decree of
abatement or indemnity. They say it would be making a new con-
tract for the parties,*" or it does not appear that the parties cannot
be put in a status quo,--, or it would impair the marketability of
the land,- or it would compel the vendee to accept an imperfect
'At least eight states have given the surviving wife an interest in fee
in the real property her husband was seised of during coverture: Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
""In these states the courts need not determine the length of the life
of the wife in determining the value of her life estate. At the death of the
husband, the value of the wife's dower interest becomes apparent; and its
value will be the same whether the wife lives one day or one hundred years
longer than her husband.
"'See footnote 15.
....In statutory dower the wife gets an interest in fee only if she survives
her husband. See Minnesota Statutes, (1941) sec. 525.16; Code of Iowa,
(1939) see. 11990.
23Wright v. Young, (1858) 6 Wis. 125, 70 Am. Dec. 453; Hazelrig v.
Hutson, (1862) 18 Ind. 481; Tebeau v. Ridge, (1914) 261 Mo. 547, 170
S. W. 871, L. R. A. 1915C 367; Williams v. Wessels, (1915) 94 Kan. 71,
145 Pac. 856; Najarian v. Boyajian, (1927) 48 R. I. 213, 136 At. 767.
1-Kuratli v. Jackson, (1911) 60 Or. 203, 207, 118 Pac. 192, 38 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1195, and note; Ann. Cas. 1914A 203.
,'"In fixing $250, or any other sum, (as the amount to be retained from
the purchase price) the court is simply making a guess, as mere a guess as
if we were to undertake to say, whether a white ball or a black would be
drawn by lot from an urn containing an equal number of each color."
Humphrey v. Clement, (1867) 44 Ill. 299, 301.
'Phillips v. Stauch, (1870) 20 Mich. 369; Riesz's Appeal, (1873) 73
Pa. 485; Kuratli v. Jackson, (1911) 60 Or. 203, 118 Pac. 192, 38 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1195, and note Ann. Cas. 1914A 203; Long v. Chandler, (1914)
10 Del. Ch. 339, 92 Atl. 256; Solomon v. Schwitz, (1915) 185 Mich. 620,
152 N. W. 196, 3 A. L. R. 557; Reilly v. Cullinane, (1923) 53 App. D. C.
17, 287 Fed. 994.
7Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10 Del. Ch. 339, 92 Atl. 256.
6Riesz's Appeal, (1873) 73 Pa. 485; Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10 Del.
Ch. 339, 92 At. 256.
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title which he had not in mind when he agreed to purchase, 2 or it
would result in great pecuniary injury to all parties involved, 3)
or it would cause too much injury to the vendor who has not been
at fault,," or it would be protecting a vendee who knew when he
entered the contract that the vendor could not convey all the lands
without his wife's consent.32 Perhaps all of these rather confused
reasons have their merit. At any rate, they form some basis upon
which the courts may rest their decision if they decide against an
abatement or indemnity bond.
A second group of courts allows specific performance with an
abatement of the purchase price for the wife's inchoate interest.-
Many of these courts hark back to the old general rule that the
purchaser has the option of having the contract specifically per-
formed as far as the vendor can perform it and have an abatement
out of the purchase money "for any deficiency in the title, quantity,
quality, description or other matters touching the estate. 34 The
unreleased inchoate dower interest of the wife is a defect in title.3
Thus the purchaser did not get what he bargained for and should
not be required to pay the full purchase price.3 6 A few courts have
either said it would be unjust to make an innocent purchaser suffer
2 9Solomon v. Schwitz, (1915) 185 Mich. 620, 152 N. W. 196, 3 A. L. R.
557. This reasoning is rather weak. No case has been found wherein the
vendee is forced to accept a partial performance of the contract to convey.3
"Phillips v. Stauch, (1870) 20 Mich. 369.
3
'Riesz's Appeal, (1873) 73 Pa. 485.
3 2
"If he has purchased with-knowledge of the contingent right of the
wife, it is no great hardship that he should be compelled to take the hus-
band's deed alone, with the risk or possibility of his wife having an estate
in dower, and be made to rely for compensation in that even upon his cove-
nant of title." Milam v. Williams, (1914) 73 XV. Va. 467, 469, 80 S. E.
770; Lucas v. Scott, (1885) 41 Ohio St. 636; Fisher v. Miller, (1926) 92
Fla. 48, 109 So. 257. The more recent cases decided in these same courts
have not made knowledge an issue. Barnes v. Christy, (1921) 102 Ohio
St. 160, 131 N. E. 352; see Taylor v. Day, (1931) 102 Fla. 1006, 1013, 136
So. 701.
:
3 3Williams v. Wessels, (1915) 94 Kan. 71, 145 Pac. 856; Martin v.
Merritt, (1877) 57 Ind. 34, 26 Am. Rep. 45; City of Murray v. Holcomb,
(1932) 243 Ky. 287, 47 S. W. (2d) 1026; Brookings v. Cooper, (1926) 256
Mass. 121, 152 N. E. 243, 46 A. L. R. 745, and note; Sanborn v. Hockin,
(1874) 20 Minn. 178, Gil. 163; Scheerer v. Scheerer, (1921) 287 Mo. 92.
229 S. W. 192; Feldman v. Linsanski, (1924) 239 N. Y. 81, 145 N. E. 746;
Najarian v. Boyajian, (1927) 48 R. I. 213, 136 Atl. 767; Wright v. Young.
(1858) 6 Wis. 125, 70 Am. Dec. 453.
3 1Martin v. Merritt, (1877) 57 Ind. 34, 26 Am. Rep. 45; Melamed
v. Donabedian, (1921) 238 Mass. 133, 130 N. E. 110.
3 5Wright v. Young, (1858) 6 Wis. 125, 70 Ann. Dec. 453; Feldman v.
Linsanski, (1924) 239 N. Y. 81, 145 N. E. 746.
3 6Williams v. Wessels, (1915) 94 Kan. 71, 145 Pac. 856.
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because the vendor has broken his contract :- or the vendor is in
default and should not be heard to complain." These seem to be
cogent reasons for desiring an abatement. Yet many courts of
equity, though they feel constrained to offer the vendee some form
of relief, find it impossible to decree specific performance with an
abatement because of the practical difficulty of accurately ascertain-
ing the value of the wife's inchoate dower interest.39 Some courts
simply allow an abatement without discussion of any of the difficul-
ties herein indicated." Others suggest that there is no more diffi-
cult, in ascertaining the amount of an abatement in an action of
specific performance than damages in an action at law.4 1 It has
been suggested that the courts which allow abatement are those
in which law and equity are administered by the same courts, the
distinction in procedure between them being abolished. 42 That may
be, but it still seems impossible to justify an abatement in an
equity procedure.'
A few jurisdictions have forsaken the quibbling over abatement
and have found a more just solution to the problem.4 4 They have
allowed the purchaser, upon sufficient security, to retain a portion
of the purchase price to indemnify himself against the future dower
claims of the vendor's wife.4- There are three different schemes
3
7
"The defaulting option giver should not get the whole purchase price
and then as a reward for his breach of contract keep one-third of the title
in a life estate in the family." Tebeau v. Ridge, (1914) 261 Mo. 547, 571,
170 S. W. 871, L. R. A. 1915C 367.
6 !See Sebold v. Williams, (1942) 203 Ark. 741, 744, 158 S. W. (2d)t67.
'M 'See footnote 12.
4eVWingate v. Hamilton, (1855) 7 Ind. 73; Park v. Johnson, (1862) 4
Allen 259; Sanborn v. Nockin, (1874) 20 Minn. 178, Gil. 163; City of
Murray v. Holcomb, (1932) 243 Ky. 287, 47 S. W. (2d) 1026.
1"'If the damages can be assessed at law, then, upon the same prin-
ciple, and with the same ease, the compensation can be ascertained in equity."
Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, (1926) 3rd ed., 942. Williams
v. Wessels, (1915) 94 Kan. 71, 145 Pac. 856; Najarian v. Boyajian, (1927)
48 R. 1. 213, 136 At. 767.42Kuratli v. Jackson, (1911) 60 Or. 203, 209, 118 Pac. 192, 38 L. R. A.(N.S.) 1195, and note, Ann. Cas. 1914A 203; Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10
Del. Ch. 339, 347, 92 Ati. 256.4 
'North Carolina allows an abatement only where there has been a
stipulation in the contract against incumbrances. Bethell v. McKinney,(1913) 164 N. C. 71, 80 S. E. 162.41Bradford v. Smith, (1904) 123 Iowa 41, 98 N. W. 377; Sadler v.
Radcliff, (1927) 215 Ala. 499, 111 So. 231; Sebold v. Williamson, (1942)
203 Ark. 741, 158 S. W. (2d) 667; Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy,(1943) 203 S. C. 59, 26 S. E. (2d) 175, 148 A. L. R. 285, and note. See
Handy v. Rice, (1904) 98 Me. 504, 57 At. 847.
.'The American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts, sec. 365,
illustration 4, says that there should either be an abatement or sufficient
indemnity against future injury to the purchaser in case the vendor's wife
should survive him and enforce her rights.
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of indemnity. By the Iowa rule, if the wife refuses to release her
dower interest, the vendee has the option of accepting performance
by the husband to the extent of his ability and the retention of so
much of the purchase money as ,shall be proportionate to the highest
outstanding or contingent interest not conveyed, without paying
interest on it." The amount so retained is either paid over to the
clerk of court or is secured by a lien, created in favor of the vendor,
on the lands in question.4 7 The Alabama rule calls for the retention
of one-half or one-third of the purchase price, as the wife may
presently appear to be entitled under the statutes of that state.4 S
If the vendor's wife dies first, the amount reserved, with legal
interest, is paid to the surviving vendor. If she survives her hus-
band, then the purchaser need only pay interest on the amount
reserved up to the time of the vendor's death; and, by way of com-
pensation, he retains the portion of the purchase price originally
withheld as indemnity, without paying interest on it up to the time
of' the death of the vendor's wife. At her death, the purchaser pays
the heirs at law of the vendor the amount retained as indemnity,
with the accrued interest up to the time of the vendor's death. The
ultimate payment of the amount reserved as indemnity is secured
by a decretal order making it a lien upon the land, or else by a
mortgage on the land, conditioned and payable as above de-
scribed.
4 9
There is yet a third method of indemnifying the vendee against
the claims of the vendor's wife. The Souht Carolina court has
rather arbitrarily decreed that one-sixth of the present value of the
real estate in question is the wife's common law dower interest at
any given time. Thus if the vendor's wife refused to join in the
conveyance, they allow the vendee to retain an amount equivalent
to one-sixth of the value of the lands (not one-sixth of the purchase
price) as indemnity. The purchaser must deliver to the vendor a
bond in writing for th amount retained, secured by a mortgage on
46Leach v. Forney, (1866) 21 Iowa 271, 89 Am. Dec. 574; Presser v.
Hildenbrand, (1867) 23 Iowa 483; Sebold v. Williamson, (1942) 203 Ark.
741, 158 S. W. (2d) 667.
47Bradford v. Smith, (1904) 123 Ia. 41, 98 N. W. 377; Thompson v.
Colby, (1905) 127 Ia. 234 103 N. W. 117.
4
8in Alabama the amount of the dower depends upon whether the hus-
band leaves lineal descendents, whether the estate is solvent, whether the
wife has a separate estate, and upon the relative value of the wife's separate
estate. At most the gurviving wife can have a life estate in one half of the
estates her husband was seised of during coverture. Alabama Code of 1928,
secs. 7427-7430.
49
Lfinge v. Green, (1912) 176 Ala. 343, 58 So. 381; Sadler v. Radcliff,(1927) 215 Ala. 499, 111 So. 231.
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the lands in question, payable to the vendor, and conditioned to
pay the vendor interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per
annum on the said sum, payable annually so long as the vendor's
wife lives; and upon her death, while the vendor still lives, the
vendee must pay the said sum to him. If the vendor's wife sur-
vives her husband, upon his death the vendee must pay her the
amount so retained with any accrued interest. In this way the vendee
can get a clear title to the land which not even the vendor's wife
can defeat.50 The South Carolina rule has one fatal weakness. It is
doubtful that any other court, under similar circumstances, would
require the wife to involuntarily relinquish her dower right, even
if she is sufficiently compensated. 51
In comparing the Alabama rule with the Iowa rule, it might be
well to remember that in Alabama the wife gets at most a life
interest in a portion of the lands her husband was seised of during
coverture;52 while in Iowa the surviving wife gets a one-third
interest in fee.53 Much more elaborate provisions are needed to com-
pensate the purchaser for the loss of a life estate than for the loss
of a fee interest. And even though, by the Alabama rule, interest
was used to make compensation for the life estate in the surviving
wife, it was also used to compensate the vendor for the loss of a
portion of the purchase price while both he and his wife lived.
In the latter respect, the Alabama rule is probably more just in its
application than the Iowa rule. While the purchaser enjoys the full
use of the land he ought to pay interest on the part of the purchase
price retained as indemnity. He ought not to enjoy the use of the
purchase price and the land both. 54 Those who favor an abatement
might object that indemnity with such interest is hardly better than
no relief at all.' For there are instances in which the vendee, after
.',Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. MfcCoy, (1943) 203 S. C. 59, 26 S. E.
(2d) 175, 148 A. L. R. 285, and note. With the aid of legislation, the MNaine
court has reached almost the same result. Handy v. Rice, (1904) 98 Me.
504, 57 Atl. 847.
NiSee Leach v. Forney, (1866) 21 Ia. 271, 89 Am. Dec. 574; Walker v.
Kellcy, (1892) 91 Mich. 212, 217, 51 N. W. 934; Barbour v. Hickey, (1894)
2 App. D. C. 207, 213, 24 L. R. A. 763; M1inge v. Green, (1912) 176 Ala
343, 58 So. 381; Long v. Chandler, (1914) 10 Del. Ch. 339, 342, 92 Atl
256; Williams v. Wessels, (1915) 94 Kan. 71, 76, 145 Pac. 856. The South
Carolina court has vigorously denied that such a decree would be uncon-
stitutional because it deprives the wife of her dower right without due
process of law. Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. M[cCoy. (1944) 30 S. E. (2d)
856.
'-Alabama Code of 1928, sec. 7427.
•
3Code of Iowa, (1939) sec. 11990.
'4Minge v. Green, (1912) 176 Ala. 343. 58 So. 381.
',See the dissent by Justice Mayfield in Minge v. Green, (1912) 176
Ala. 343, 364, 58 So. 381.
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paying the vendor as interest an amount in excess of that originally
retained, might yet have to pay the amount withheld as indemnity
and still only get what he could have had in the first instance by pay-
ing the full purchase price and ignoring the dower interest of the
vendor's wife.56 Either form of indemnity is bad in that the lands
may be tied up for almost two lives in being.57 However, the old
objection that it is an impossibility for any human agency to ap-
proximate the present value of the wife's dower interest is not as
important in the case of indemnity as it is in abatement. Under
either rule of indemnity the vendor is assured of the eventual pay-
ment of the full contract price if his wife's dower interest does not
vest. And if it does, why should he be entitled to the full purchase
price? Therefore, there are no contingencies. At most the vendor
unjustly loses the use of part of the purchase price for a time,
and by one rule he is even compensated for that. Moreover, the
exact value of the wife's dower interest need not be ascertained for
indemnity. The amount retained would be made large enough to
cover all contingencies.58 Even so, admittedly the retention of a
large portion of the purchase price by the vendee may cause some
hardship to the vendor who may not have been personally at fault. 9
In fine, because of the contingent nature of the wife's incohate
dower interest, there is probably no method of doing justice to all
parties involved. But, after careful consideration, it can hardly be
denied that in states where common law dower still exists, the
rule laid down by the Alabama court, even with all its faults, is
the nearest approach to total justice. In states such as Minnesota
where there is a statutory substitute for dower, wherein the wife
is given an interest in fee in all the lands her husband was seised of
during coverture, a modified form of the Iowa rule might be
56"Suppose the chancellor fixes it (the amount of indemnity) at $2000,
then the complainant must pay interest (8%) on this amount till the wife
signs, or she or the husband dies. Suppose the husband and wife both live
50 years, and the wife dies first, the complainant will have paid $8,000 as
interest and the $2,000 indemnity, makifig $10,000 and will get nothing
more than he would have gotten had he taken the deed of the husband alone
in the beginning." Minge v. Green, (1912) 176 Ala. 343, 365, 58 So. 381.
57See dissent in Minge v. Green, (1912) 176 Ala. 343, 365, 58 So. 381.
58Wannamaker v. Brown, (1906) 77 S. C. 64, 57 S. E. 665; see
Springles' Heirs and Adm'rs v. Shields, (1850) 17 Ala. 295, 298; Long v.
Chandler, (1914) 10 Del. Ch. 339, 351, 92 Atl. 256.
59Riesz's Appeal, (1873) 73 Pa. 485, 491. New Jersey, a jurisdiction
which generally denies either abatement or indemnity, allows indemnity
where there has been fraud or bad faith ifn the wife's refusal to release her
dower. Young v. Paul, (1855) 10 N. J. Eq. 401, 64 Am. Dec. 456; Miller v.
Headley, (1931) 109 N. J. Eq. 436, 158 Atl. 118; see also Free v. Little,
(1907) 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407.
